Assessing the Value of Network Security Technologies by Cavusoglu, Huseyin - University of Texas at Dallas & Cavusoglu, Hasan - University of British Columbia
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org
 
 
 
Working Paper #07-19 
 
September 2007 
 
Assessing the Value of Network Security Technologies
 
Huseyin Cavusoglu
University of Texas at Dallas 
 
Hasan Cavusoglu
University of British Columbia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
ASSESSING THE VALUE OF NETWORK SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES:  
THE IMPACT OF CONFIGURATION AND INTERACTION ON VALUE1 
 
 
 
Huseyin Cavusoglu 
School of Management  
The University of Texas at Dallas 
 Richardson, TX 75083 
huseyin@utdallas.edu 
 
Hasan Cavusoglu 
Sauder School of Business 
University of British Columbia 
Vancouver, BC V6T1Z2 
cavusoglu@sauder.ubc.ca 
 
Abstract 
Proper configuration of security technologies is critical to balance the access and protection 
requirements of information. The common practice of using a layered security architecture that 
has multiple technologies amplifies the need for proper configuration because the configuration 
decision about one security technology has ramifications for the configuration decisions about 
others. We study the impact of configuration on the value obtained from a firewall and an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). We also study how a firewall and an IDS interact with each 
other in terms of value contribution. We show that the firm may be worse off when it deploys a 
technology if the technology (either the firewall or the IDS) is improperly configured. A more 
serious consequence for the firm is that even if each of these (improperly configured) 
technologies offers a positive value when deployed alone, deploying both may be detrimental to 
the firm. Configuring the IDS and the firewall optimally eliminates the conflict between them, 
resulting in a non-negative value to the firm. When optimally configured, we find that these 
technologies may complement or substitute each other. Further, we find that while the optimal 
configuration of an IDS is the same whether it is deployed alone or together with a firewall, the 
optimal configuration of a firewall has a lower detection rate (i.e., allow more access) when it is 
deployed with an IDS than when deployed alone. Our results highlight the complex interactions 
between firewall and IDS technologies when they are used together in a security architecture, 
and, hence, the need for proper configuration in order to benefit from these technologies. 
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1. Introduction 
Software configuration refers to the process of setting software quality parameters to meet 
specific user requirements. Proper configuration is particularly critical for information 
technology (IT) security software as evidenced by frequent warnings by security experts about 
risks from using default (“out-of-the-box”) settings (McCarthy 1998). The commonly cited risk 
is that default configurations are insecure and using them allows hackers to exploit known 
software vulnerabilities more easily (Piessens 2002). Configuration is also important from an 
operational economics perspective. For instance, CERT’s guidelines (CERT 2001) for installing 
security software recommend that firms adjust configuration to balance their own security and 
operational requirements2. Further, configuration becomes more important in an IT security 
context because firms typically deploy a layered security architecture that has diverse security 
software.  
The primary goal of IT security is balancing the conflicting needs of information protection 
and information access. To achieve this goal, firms typically deploy technologies such as 
firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs), along with physical security measures such as 
manual investigations and physical access controls. The deployment of multiple technologies 
makes configuration challenging because the configuration decision regarding one technology 
has ramifications on the configuration decisions of others, and, consequently, configuration 
decisions will have to be coordinated to achieve optimal overall performance.  A recent Gartner 
report highlights the problem associated with excessive false alarms generated by IDSs that are 
not configured properly (Gartner 2003).  Further, the debate within the IT security community 
about whether a firewall obviates or complements the need for IDS and vice versa (Magalhaes 
2004, Gigabit 2004) illustrates the mixed experiences about the performance of these 
technologies when deployed together. Axelsson (2000) summarized the debate as “The best 
effort [security] is often achieved when several security measures are brought to bear together. 
How should intrusion detection collaborate with other security mechanisms to this synergy 
effect? How do we ensure that the combination of security measures provides at least the same 
level of security as each applied singly would provide, or that the combination does in fact lower 
the overall security of the protected system?”,  and he continued “…they [these questions] 
remain largely un-addressed by the research community. This is perhaps not surprising, since 
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many of these questions are difficult to formulate and answer.”  The research described in this 
paper seeks to shed light on the above questions raised by the security community regarding the 
configuration of and interaction between security technologies. Specifically, we study (i) how a 
firm should configure a firewall and an IDS when they are deployed together or separately in the 
security architecture of the firm, (ii) how the firewall and the IDS interact with each other in 
value creation (i.e., whether they are complementary, substitutes or conflicting), and (iii) how 
optimal configuration impacts the type of interaction between these security technologies.   
The most significant findings of this study are the following. We show that the firm may be 
worse off when it deploys a technology (either the firewall or the IDS) if the technology is 
improperly configured. A more serious consequence for the firm is that even if each of these 
(improperly configured) technologies offers a positive value when deployed alone, the firm may 
realize a lower value when it deploys both than when it deploys only one of them. Configuring 
both the IDS and the firewall optimally eliminates the conflict, and hence, the detrimental effect 
of deploying them together. When optimally configured, a firewall may complement (i.e., 
enhances the value of) an IDS and vice versa provided it is optimal for the firm to prohibit 
external access in the absence of a firewall. We find that an optimally configured IDS behaves as 
a deterrent, and, hence, allowing external access may become attractive to the firm when it 
deploys the IDS whereas the preventing external access may be more desirable when it does not 
deploy the IDS. While the optimal configuration of an IDS remains the same whether or not a 
firewall is deployed, a firewall should be configured to operate at a lower detection rate (i.e., 
allow more access) when it is used with an IDS than without. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in 
Section 2. We discuss the configuration problem and our model in section 3. We derive the 
equilibrium hacking and investigation strategies in section 4. In section 5, we analyze the value 
of firewall and IDS when they are deployed at their default configurations, and in section 6, we 
analyze optimal configuration decisions. In Section 7, we show the robustness of our results by 
analyzing alternative model specifications. In section 8, we discuss the implications of our 
results and future research directions. 
2. Related Literature 
Research on information security technologies has analyzed both the technical and the economic 
aspects surrounding the design and implementation of security controls. The technical research 
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has focused largely on the design of algorithms related to firewalls, IDSs and others such as 
encryption. Various approaches to firewall design are discussed in (Holden 2004, Gouda and Liu 
2004).  IDS design uses two broad approaches. The significant developments in signature-based 
IDSs are highlighted in (Garvey and Lunt 1991, Porras and Kemmerer 1992, Ilgun 1992, Lunt 
1993, Kumar and Spafford 1996, Monrose and Rubin 1997). The algorithms employed in 
anomaly-based IDSs are presented in (Lunt and Jagannathan 1988, Lunt 1990, Lunt 1993, 
D’haeseleer et al. 1996, Porras and Neumann 1997, Frincke et al. 1996, Neumann and Porras 
1999, Zamboni and Spafford 1999). Since the environments where firewalls and IDSs are 
deployed vary, these technologies are designed so that their behavior can be tuned by individual 
firms through the process of configuration to fit their operating environments. We focus on 
configuration issues faced by firms that deploy these technologies and consequently, we assume 
that their design is exogenous to our problem. 
Research on the economics of security technologies is based on the notion that security 
technologies are imperfect, and, therefore, policies based on the cost-benefit tradeoff are required 
to support these technology implementations. The imperfections of security technologies are 
typically captured using false positive and false negative error rates. Since different firms may 
have different tolerance levels for false positives and different acceptable levels for detection 
rate, researchers have begun to investigate how to configure a given IDS to fit a specific 
deployment environment. Cavusoglu, Mishra, Raghunathan (2005) analyze the value of IDSs 
and show that IDSs offer a positive value only when they deter hackers. Ulvila and Gaffney 
(2004) propose a decision analysis approach to configure IDSs. Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 
(2004) compare decision analysis and game theoretic approaches to configure IDSs and show 
that the game theoretic approach is superior to the decision analysis approach. Cavusoglu, Ogut, 
and Raghunathan (2006) analyze optimal waiting time policies to deal with the problem of false 
alarms in an IDS. Researchers also investigated the issue of configuration of firewalls. Yue and 
Baghci (2003) consider how to tune the quality parameters of a firewall to maximize its benefit. 
All these studies in this stream of research focus on a single technology. None of them considers 
the issue of configuration when multiple technologies are deployed as part of a layered security 
architecture and, therefore, does not address interaction between security technologies.  
Researchers have also addressed other aspects of information security such as security 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure (Schechter 2002, Ozment 2004, Cavusoglu et al. 2007, 
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Nizovtsev and Thursby 2005), security information sharing (Gordon et al. 2003, Gal-Or and 
Ghose 2005), patch management (Cavusoglu et al. 2008, August and Tunca 2005), and security 
investments and risk management (Ogut et al. 2005). However, this stream of research does not 
model specific security technologies, and, therefore do not provide insights into how security 
technologies should be configured to minimize the cost of security.  
3. Model Description 
We model an environment in which a firm is evaluating the adoption of security technologies to 
extend its enterprise by providing access to outside vendors and partners. The common practice 
in such contexts is to implement a ‘defense-in-depth’ IT security architecture (Whitman and 
Mattord 2003). In this architecture, three layers – the firewall at the network (periphery) layer, 
the IDS at the host (middle) layer, and manual investigation at the data (interior) level – are 
employed to provide security. Firewalls are implemented to control the traffic between a trusted 
network (“Internal”) and un-trusted (“External”) networks. The internal network is trusted 
because the firm can exercise its own security policies over the network. The firm does not have 
such control over external networks. Even though external networks are un-trusted, the firm may 
still want to allow communication from external networks. In this setup a firewall controls the 
traffic between internal and external networks using an Access Control List (ACL). An IDS 
monitors events occurring in host and internal systems and warn human experts about suspected 
intrusions. A key difference between firewall and IDS technologies is that while a firewall takes 
actions against a suspected intrusion by blocking the traffic, an IDS only sends an alarm to the 
security administrator about a potential intrusion, who may terminate the user’s session3. 
Another difference is although an IDS can detect intrusions originating from both internal and 
external networks, a firewall can prevent intrusions coming from only external networks. 
Both a firewall and an IDS are configurable within their design profiles.  The design profile 
of a firewall or an IDS is depicted as a curve, known as the ROC curve, that relates the 
probability of true detection (stopping an illegal external user in case of a firewall, and raising an 
alarm for an unauthorized activity of a user in case of an IDS) and the probability of false 
detection (stopping a legal external user in case of firewall, and raising an alarm for a normal 
activity of a user in case of IDS). The shape of the ROC curve depends on the algorithm used by 
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the technology. In a typical ROC curve, the probability of true detection is higher than the 
probability of false detection, and the probability of true detection is an increasing concave 
function of the probability of false detection (Trees 2001). We discuss the derivation of an ROC 
curve in Section 3.2. Security administrators can configure an IDS or a firewall to operate at a 
specific point on the ROC curve by tuning certain parameters in the case of an IDS or by 
modifying the ACL (rules and its attributes) in a firewall.  
3.1 The Model 
We discuss the three broad components of our model- user, firm, and technology- in the 
following paragraphs.  
User:  We consider two types of users. All internal users have access to the system from inside 
the firewall, i.e., they do not go through the firewall. The external users access the system from 
outside the firewall, and, hence, they are validated by the firewall, if one exists, before accessing 
the system. We assume that ε  fraction of users is external users. We classify users also into 
legal and illegal users. Legal users are those that offer a positive payoff to the firm if they do not 
abuse their privileges whereas illegal users do not offer a positive payoff the firm under any 
circumstances. While all internal users are legal users of the system, only a proportion ζ of 
external users are legal users. The reason for this difference between internal and external users 
is that, as explained previously, the firm can control its internal users by deploying its own 
authentication and other access control mechanisms, but the firm does not have a similar control 
over external users4. Clearly, an ideal firewall will allow all legal external users and stop all 
illegal external users. After gaining access to the system, a user (internal or external) may choose 
to abuse (intrude) the system by executing unauthorized actions. The objective of an IDS is to 
detect intrusions by internal as well as external users. 
A user (internal or external) that abuses the system, whom we refer to as a hacker, derives a 
benefit of µ, if the intrusion is undetected. If the intrusion is detected, the hacker incurs a penalty 
of β  for a net benefit of ( )µ β− . We assume that µ β≤ ; that is, a hacker that is detected does 
not enjoy a positive benefit. Users that gain access to the system choose to hack depending on 
factors such as µ, β , and the likelihood that they will get caught. We denote the probability of 
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hacking for a user as ψ . An illegal external user could also derive an additional utility solely 
from cracking the firewall; that is, even if the illegal external user does not abuse the system after 
gaining access, he/she may enjoy some utility. Because this additional utility does not change our 
results, we have normalized it to zero.  
Firm: We consider a single firm, which may deploy only a firewall, only an IDS, both a firewall 
and an IDS, or neither in its security architecture. The payoffs to the firm under different 
scenarios of system usage are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. The Payoffs to the Firm 
 Normal Use Undetected Intrusion Detected Intrusion 
Internal User ω  d−  (1 )dφ− −  
Legal External User ω  d−  (1 )dφ− −  
Illegal External User 0 d−  (1 )dφ− −  
We normalize the payoff to the firm from an external illegal user that has gained access but does 
not further abuse the system to zero. We assume that the benefit to the firm under normal use by 
a legal user is ω . When a user hacks the system and the hacking is undetected, the firm incurs a 
damage of d . However, the firm can detect hacking by manually investigating user log files. 
Firms can confirm or rule out hacking only through manual investigation. In general, manual 
investigation is too costly to be done all the time. When the firm does not deploy an IDS, the 
firm may manually investigate a proportion of users. When the firm deploys an IDS, the firm 
may investigate a proportion of users that generate alarms from the IDS and a possibly different 
proportion of users that do not generate alarms. The firm incurs a cost of c  each time it performs 
a manual investigation. We assume that manual investigations confirm or rule out intrusions with 
certainty.5 If the firm detects hacking, the firm prevents or recovers a fraction, 1φ≤ , of d . It is 
reasonable to assume that c dφ≤  so that the firm’s cost of investigation is not higher than the 
benefit it gets if it detects an intrusion. The firm’s payoff parameters may not be independent, but 
dependence among these parameters does not change the essential results of the paper.  
Firewall: We measure the effectiveness of a firewall through two parameters: FDP  and 
F
FP . 
F
DP  is 
the probability that the firewall stops an illegal external user. FFP  is the probability that the 
                                                 
5
 Our results do not change qualitatively when manual investigation is imperfect. 
 7 
firewall stops a legal external user. In practice, the value of FFP  is likely to be low, and 
F
DP  is 
likely to be high. However, for a given firewall, these parameters are not independent. Security 
stance of the firm, reflected by its configuration decision, determines the combination of FDP  and 
F
FP  for the firewall deployed. While the paranoid approach in configuration leads to a high 
F
DP  
and FFP  , the open approach results in a low 
F
DP  and 
F
FP .  For a given firewall, we capture the 
relationship between FDP  and 
F
FP  as 
F
DP = ( ) FrFFP . We derive this functional form for the ROC 
curve in Section 3.2. 
 IDS: The model for the IDS is similar to that of a firewall. That is, IDP  is the probability that the 
IDS raises an alarm for an intrusion. IFP  is the probability that the IDS raises an alarm when 
there is no intrusion. These quality parameters are determined by the configuration for a given 
technology profile of the IDS. As in the case of firewall, the probability of detection and the 
probability of false alarm are related by  IDP = ( ) IrIFP , where rI captures the technology profile of 
the IDS. 
 3.2 Derivation of ROC Curve 
The ROC curve for a security technology can be derived analytically or experimentally (Durst et 
al. 1999, Lippmann et al. 2000). In the following paragraph, we illustrate the analytical 
derivation of the ROC curve for a firewall. Similar approach is also used to derive the ROC 
curve for an IDS, and is discussed in Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan (2005). Consider a 
firm that is configuring the ACL for a firewall.  Firms decide whether to put an external site (say 
an IP address) in the ‘deny’ list or ‘permit’ list of a firewall based on the level of threat (“threat 
index”) associated with the traffic coming from that site. The threat index represents the 
estimated probability that a user from that site is an illegal user. A firm includes a site in the 
‘permit’ list only when the threat index for that site is below a threshold value. For instance, 
Cisco PIX firewall relies on this type of index values to deny or permit traffic. Similarly, IDSs 
classify a user as hacker or not based on whether a numerical score computed from the 
transaction history (i.e., anomaly index) exceeds a threshold value.  
Let the estimated threat index for a site be x, and the threshold value that determines whether 
to put the site in the ‘permit’ or in the ‘deny’ list be t.  Let a site for which x > t be put in the 
‘deny’ list. We assume that ( )Tf x  and ( )Uf x  are the probability density functions of x for 
 8 
“trusted” sites and “untrusted” sites, respectively. We assume that ( )Uf x stochastically 
dominates ( )Tf x , i.e., ( ) ( ),T UF x F x x≥ ∀ . This assumption implies that trusted sites are less of a 
threat than untrusted sites. It follows that  
( )  and ( )F FD U F T
t t
P f x dx P f x dx
∞ ∞
= =∫ ∫
 
We can easily show that > F FD FP P . Further, FDP  is an increasing concave function of FFP  for many 
probability distributions. The exact shape of the ROC curve depends on the probability density 
function of x. We assume that x follows an exponential distribution. Exponential distributions, 
besides being analytically tractable, capture the skewed nature of threat index of trusted and 
untrusted sites very well6. If x for trusted and untrusted sites follow exponential distributions 
with parameters Tθ and Uθ , U Tθ θ> , respectively, then we get: 
( )U UxF
D U
t
tP e dx eθ θθ
∞
− −= =∫ ,   ( )T TxFF T
t
tP e dx eθ θθ
∞
− −= =∫ ,  
( ) FrF FD FP P⇒ =  , where TF Ur
θ
θ
= is between zero and one. The parameter rF represents the design 
profile of the firewall. The lower the value of rF, the better the quality of the firewall. Figure 1 
shows sample ROC curves for various values of r.
 
 For both the firewall and the IDS, we use this 
power function for the ROC curve in our analysis. 
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Figure 1. ROC curves for various values of  r. 
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We make two observations regarding our modeling of the IT access and protection problem. 
First, a user is penalized only when the firm detects an abuse of the system.  If an illegal external 
user attempts to gain access and is stopped by the firewall, he/she does not incur any penalty. 
This assumption is reasonable because we know that firewalls routinely stop numerous hacking 
attempts by users, and these users are not (and cannot be) penalized. Second, in our model, we 
normalize the payoffs such that cracking a firewall alone does not cause any damage to the firm. 
The firm incurs damage only when the user abuses the system, after gaining access. This 
assumption is reasonable because a significant proportion of intruders, known as sport hackers, is 
not interested in doing anything more than penetrating the firm’s firewall mechanism and “take a 
look around” (Campbell et al. 2003, p. 242). Though the firm does not incur any direct damage 
when an illegal user gains access, the firm does incur an indirect cost in that an illegal user can 
never benefit the firm, but a legal user can. We also note that even if the firm is assumed to incur 
a fixed cost when an illegal user cracks the firewall, the equilibrium that we derive and our 
qualitative results about the value of firewall and IDS and interactions between a firewall and an 
IDS do not change. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The timeline for the game 
We model the security problem as a multi-stage game with observed actions between the 
firm and users of the system, as shown by the timeline given in Figure 2. First, the firm decides 
its security architecture, i.e., it decides whether to implement only a firewall, only an IDS, both a 
firewall and an IDS, or neither a firewall nor an IDS. Then, in stage 1, the firm chooses the 
configuration of technologies it decided to implement in stage 0.  Then, given the configuration, 
the firm decides its manual investigation strategy while users decide their hacking strategies. 
Finally, the payoffs are realized. We assume that the firm and users are risk neutral. The 
rationale for the timeline is that configuration decisions are more strategic (long-term) and are 
more difficult to change compared to manual investigation strategies because changes to 
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Firm decides the 
configuration of the 
security technologies 
 
Firm decides its 
investigation strategy 
while a user chooses 
his hacking strategy   
 
The payoffs are  
realized 
 
Firm chooses the 
security technologies 
to implement 
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software configurations often require extensive testing prior to implementation7. We assume that 
all parameters are common knowledge to all players. Thus, in stage 1 of the game, the firm 
decides its configuration decision by rationally anticipating its and users’ optimal strategies in 
stage 2 of the game. In stage 2, both the firm and users observe the configuration decisions of 
stage 1, and simultaneously decide their strategies. Thus, we assume that in stage 2, users know 
whether the firm has implemented one, both, or, none of the technologies, and their 
configurations. This assumption is reasonable because it is well known that attackers, both 
internal and external, acquire knowledge about hosts and networks and their vulnerabilities using 
a variety of techniques including social engineering, probing, and IP fingerprinting before 
launching their attacks (Whitman and Mattord 2003). It is possible that internal users may have 
better information about the firm’s decisions in stage 1 than external users. We capture this 
difference by assuming that internal users have perfect knowledge about firm’s decisions in stage 
1, but external users are uncertain about configuration decisions. An external user’s belief about 
the firewall configuration has a probability density function ( )F FDg p  with mean equal to the true 
firewall configuration FDP  and support [ ,F FD DP P ]. Similarly, an external user’s belief about the 
IDS configuration has a probability density function ( )I IDg p  with mean equal to the true IDS 
configuration IDP  and support [ ,I ID DP P ]. These probability functions imply that users’ beliefs about 
configurations are unbiased. 
4. Model Analysis: Equilibrium in Stage 2 
We perform the analysis using backward induction. That is, first we derive the equilibrium for 
the firm’s investigation strategy and a user’s hacking strategy given the firm’s implementation 
and configuration strategies. Note that the firm can choose to implement one, both, or none of 
the security technologies in stage 1 of the game. Subsequently, we determine the firm’s optimal 
implementation and configuration strategy. The cases when the firm implements only a firewall, 
only an IDS, or neither a firewall nor an IDS are special cases of the more general case where the 
firm implements both a firewall and an IDS. Consequently, we derive the equilibrium for the 
firewall plus IDS case and then specialize it to other cases.  
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 For instance, in a firewall, the sequence of rules is critical in implementing a security policy, and adding, deleting, 
or modifying a rule could mask (contradict) other rules in a firewall. Therefore, potential contradictions have to be 
analyzed carefully before making a change to the firewall rule set. Such issues do not arise in the case of manual 
inspection strategies. 
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When the firm implements a firewall and an IDS, the strategy of a user that has gained access 
to the system, US , is to hack, H, or not hack, NH, i.e., { , }US H NH∈ . The firm’s strategy, FS , is 
to investigate, I, or not investigate, NI, the user in each of the two states: alarm and no-alarm. 
That is, {( , ), ( , ),( , ),( , )}FS I I I NI NI I NI NI∈ , where the first element in each pair specifies the 
firm’s action when the firm observes an alarm from the IDS, and the second element is the firm’s 
action when it does not observe an alarm from the IDS. For example, ( , )I NI implies that the 
firm investigates the user if it receives an alarm from the IDS for that user and does not 
investigate if it does not receive an alarm.  
We derive the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium for the game between the firm and users. 
To do that, we first obtain the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game in stage 2.  Let 1ρ  and 
2ρ denote the firm’s investigation probabilities when the IDS raises an alarm and when the IDS 
does not raise an alarm, respectively. Table 2 in the Appendix provides the list of all probability 
expressions that are required to compute the expected payoff for the firm. 
The firm’s expected payoff per user in the alarm and no-alarm states given that the user gains 
access are given by the following: 
( )1 , | , , | 1 | 1 | 1( , ) (1 ) (1 )A I no hack Alarm E legal no hack Alarm hack Alarm hack AlarmF P P c P d P dρ ψ ω ρ ρ ρ φ− −= + − − − − −          
( )2 , | , , | 2 | 2 | 2( , ) (1 ) (1 )NA I no hack No alarm E legal no hack No alarm hack No alarm hack No alarmF P P c P d P dρ ψ ω ρ ρ ρ φ− − − − − −= + − − − − −
 
The firm’s overall expected payoff per user is:
 
( )1 2 | 1 | 2( , , ) ( , ) ( , )Access alarm Access A no alarm Access NAF P P F P Fρ ρ ψ ρ ψ ρ ψ−= +                
An internal user’s payoff from hacking is given by
                          
 
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( (1 ))I II D DH P Pρ ρ ψ µψ β ρ ρ ψ= − + −    
An external user’s expected payoff from hacking, after gaining access, is given by 
          1 2 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( (1 )) ( ) ( (1 ))
I
D
D D D D
I
D
P
I I I I I I I
E D D
P
H p p g p dp P Pρ ρ ψ µψ βψ ρ ρ µψ β ρ ρ ψ= − + − = − + −∫                                       
The firm maximizes 1( , )AF ρ ψ  when it gets an alarm from the IDS, and 2( , )NAF ρ ψ  when it does 
not get an alarm from the IDS. A user maximizes his/her payoff. 
The following Proposition shows the Nash equilibrium strategies for the firm and a user.  
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Proposition 1. The equilibrium for stage 2 of the game when the firm implements a firewall and 
an IDS is given by the following.  
* * *
1 2
* * *
1 2
, , 0 if( )
(1 )
, 1,  otherwise( ) (1 ) (1 )
I
IF
DI I I I
D D F D
I I
F D
I I I I
D F D D
cP P
d P c P P P
c P P
c P P P d P
µ µ
ψ ρ ρ
φ β β
µ β
ψ ρ ρ
φ β
 = = = ≤ − −
 − − = = = − + − −
  ■ 
{The proofs for all our results are available in the Appendix}. 
The equilibrium when the firm implements only a firewall, only an IDS, or neither an IDS 
nor a firewall can be derived from Proposition 1 by making appropriate substitutions to the 
firewall and IDS quality parameters. By substituting 0I ID FP P= =  in Proposition 1, we get the 
equilibrium when the firm implements only a firewall. The substitutions imply that no alarm is 
generated, and, by implication, no false alarm is generated. Notice that in the firewall only case, 
*
1ρ is not meaningful because it represents the probability of investigation when there is an alarm.  
The case when the firm implements only an IDS is more complex because two possibilities arise 
when there is no firewall. In the first possibility, which we refer to as the no-external-access 
(NEA) scenario, the firm does not allow external access and restricts access only to internal 
users. In the second possibility, which we refer to as the full-external-access (FEA) scenario, the 
firm allows external access despite the absence of a firewall. The former scenario can be 
analyzed by setting 1F FD FP P= =  in our model, and the latter scenario is equivalent to 
substituting 0F FD FP P= = . For the case when the firm implements neither a firewall nor an IDS, 
we substitute 0I ID FP P= = , 1 0ρ = , 2ρ ρ= , and, depending on whether we model the FEA or the 
NEA scenario, either 0F FD FP P= =  (FEA) or 1F FD FP P= =  (NEA). Based on these substitutions, 
we obtain the following result. 
Corollary 1. For stage 2 of the game, (a) the equilibrium when the firm implements only the 
IDS, for both no-external-access and full-external-access scenarios, is identical to the 
equilibrium in the firewall plus IDS case given in Proposition 1, (b) the equilibria for the 
firewall only case and the no technology case, for both no-external-access and full-external-
access scenarios, are identical and are given by the strategy profile ( * /ρ µ β= , * /c dψ φ= ).■ 
 The firm’s expected payoffs under various security architectures are given in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Firm’s Equilibrium Payoff Under Various Security Architectures 
Security Architecture Firm’s Payoff 
NEA (1 )( ( ) )d c cd
d
ε ω φ
φ
− − −
 
No 
Technology FEA ( )( ) 1 (1 )d c cd
d
ω φ ε ζ
φ
− − − −
 
Firewall Only ( )( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ( ) )
F F F F
F D D Fd c P cd P P P
d
ω φ ε εζ ε εζ
φ
− − + − − − + −
 
NEA (1 )( ( ) )
,( )
(1 )(( )( (1 ) ( )) (1 ))
,( ) (1 )
I I
ID F
DI I
D F
I I I I
ID D F F
DI I I
D F D
c d P cdP if P
c d P cP
d c P c P P cd P if P
c P P d P
ε ω φ µ
φ β
ε φ ω µ
φ β
− − +
≤
− −
− − − + − − −
>
− + −
 
IDS Only 
FEA ( )(1 (1 ))
,( )
( )( ( ) (1 (1 ))(1 )) (1 )
,( ) (1 )
I I
ID F
DI I
D F
I I I I
ID F D F
DI I I
D F F
c d P cdP if P
c d P cP
d c c P P P cd P if P
c P P d P
ω φ ε ζ µ
φ β
φ ω ε ζ µ
φ β
− − − +
≤
− −
− − + − − − − −
>
− + −
 
IDS and Firewall 
( )(1 (1 ) ) (1 ( ))
,( )
( ( )( ) (1 ))((1 ) ( ) )
( ) (1 )
( )(1 ) (1 (1 ) )
,( ) (1 )
F I F F F I
IF D D D F F
DI I
D F
I I F F F F
D F F D D F
I I I
D F D
I F
D F
I I I
D F D
c d P P cd P P P P if P
c d P cP
c P P c d cd P P P P
c P P d P
c d P w P if
c P P d P
ω φ ε εζ ε εζ µ
φ β
φ ε εζ
φ ε εζ µ
β
− − + − + − + −
≤
− −
− − + − − + −
− − − −
− − − + −
+ >
− − − −
I
DP
 
It is clear from expected payoff expressions for the no technology case that the firm will allow 
external access even when it implements neither a firewall nor an IDS,  iff 
( )
( )
/
1(1 / )
c
c d
φ
ωζ φΛ = ≤− . The numerator and the denominator are, respectively, the expected cost 
and the expected benefit from allowing access to an external user. Hence we denote the quantity 
Λ as the cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access. 
5.  The Value of a Firewall and an IDS Under Default Configurations 
We first analyze the value of a firewall and an IDS to the firm if the firm uses default 
configurations. That is, parameters FDP  (hence FFP ) and IDP  (hence IFP ) are exogenously 
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specified. Then, we consider the case when the firm chooses optimal values for these parameters 
in order to assess the value of configuration. We compute the value of a specific technology (or 
both technologies) as (firm’s expected payoff when it implements a specific technology (or both 
technologies) – firm’s expected payoff when it does not implement any technology)8. Even 
though the ROC curve for a technology relates its two quality parameters, we show them as 
though they are independent for clearer exposition. 
5.1 The Value of Implementing Only a Firewall 
Using the payoff expressions given in Table 3, we can compute the value of a firewall to be 
(1 ) 1F FD F
c c cP P
d
ε ζ ζ ω
φ φ φ
            − − − −               
  for the full-external-access scenario and 
( )(1 ) 1 1 (1 )F F FF F D
c cP P P
d
ε ωζ ζ ζ
φ φ
         − − − − − −              
 for the no-external-access scenario. Thus, we 
have the following result about the value of firewall. 
Proposition 2. For the default configuration scenario, the value of implementing only a firewall 
is positive iff 
( )
(1 )
(1 ) 1 (1 )(1 )
F F
F F
F F F F
F D F D
P P
P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ
−
<Λ<
+ − − + − −
.    ■ 
Proposition 2 shows that the firm derives a positive value from a firewall only when the cost-
to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access is neither too high nor too low. This is intuitive because 
when the value of this ratio is sufficiently high, the firm will find it optimal to prohibit external 
access even when a firewall is available, and when the ratio has a sufficiently low value, the firm 
will find it desirable to allow access to every external user. In both these cases, deployment of a 
firewall is not preferable. Of course, the range of values for the cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-
access in which the firm derives a positive value from the firewall depends on the firewall 
quality. A higher (lower) FDP  ( FFP ) for the same FFP  ( FDP ) increases the firewall quality and the 
range in which the firewall offers a positive value. The upper limit of the region specified in 
Proposition 2 represents the accuracy of the firewall in allowing external traffic, measured as the 
ratio of the likelihood that a legal user is allowed by the firewall to the likelihood that any 
external user is allowed by the firewall. The lower limit of the region represents the inaccuracy 
                                                 
8
 Our value analysis assumes that the cost of implementing a control is normalized to zero. This is a typical 
assumption in information economics (Christensen and Feltham, 2005). The idea is that a security control will not be 
implemented unless it is valuable.  
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of the firewall in dropping external traffic, measured as the ratio of the likelihood of a legal 
external user being dropped by the firewall to the likelihood of any external user being dropped 
by the firewall. Clearly, the upper limit is greater than one while the lower limit is less than one, 
which implies that a firewall can be beneficial to some firms that allow external traffic when they 
do not deploy any technology as well as to some other firms that do not allow external traffic 
when they do not deploy any technology.  
5.2. The Value of Implementing Only an IDS 
The value of IDS is given in Table 4. We highlight the significant finding as proposition 3. 
Proposition 3. For the default configuration scenario, the value of implementing only an IDS is 
positive iff ( )/ IDPµ β ≤ .         ■ 
Table 4. The Value of IDS 
Region Condition(s) The Value of IDS Is IDS 
Beneficial? 
(1 ) ( )
(1 )
I I I
D D F
I
F
P c P P
P
ωζ
ωζ
− + −
Λ<
−
 
( )( )( (1 ) (1 (1 )))
( ( ) (1 ))
I I
D F
I I I
D F D
c P P d c d
d c P P d P
φ φ ω ε ζ
φ φ
− − − + − −
−
− + −
 
no 
(1 ) ( ) 1(1 )
I I I
D D F
I
F
P c P P
P
ωζ
ωζ
− + −
<Λ<
−
 ( )
( )( )(1 )( (1 ) )
( ( ) (1 ))
( )
I I
D F
I I I
D F D
c P P d c d
d c P P d P
d c cd
d
φ ε φ ω
φ φ
ε φ ωζ
φ
− − − − +
−
− + −
− −
−
 
no 
I
DP
µ
β
>  
1Λ>  ( )( )(1 )( (1 ) )
( ( ) (1 ))
I I
D F
I I I
D F D
c P P d c d
d c P P d P
φ ε φ ω
φ φ
− − − − +
−
− + −
 
no 
1Λ<  ( )( (1 (1 )))( )
(( ) )
I I
D F
I I
D F
c P P d d c
d d c P cP
ω ε ζ φ
φ φ
− + − − −
− +
 
yes 
1
I
D
I
F
P
P
  <Λ<   
 
( )
( )( )(1 )( )
(( ) )
( )
( )
I I
D F
I I
D F
I I
D F
I I
D F
c P P d d c
d d c P cP
d c P cdP
d c P cP
ω ε φ
φ φ
ε φ ωζ
φ
− + − −
− +
− −
+
− +
 
yes 
I
DP
µ
β
≤  
I
D
I
F
P
P
  Λ>   
 
( )( )(1 )( )
(( ) )
I I
D F
I I
D F
c P P d d c
d d c P cP
ω ε φ
φ φ
− + − −
− +
 
yes 
 
 16 
Proposition 3 shows that an IDS that uses its default configuration does not always generate a 
positive value for the firm. To gain further insight into this result, we isolate the impacts of 
different effects on the IDS value.  An IDS affects the equilibrium in two ways. First, it alters the 
firm’s probability of manual investigation by allowing more targeted investigation. Second, it 
changes the users’ hacking probability by altering the probability of a hacker getting caught. We 
can write the value of IDS as the following. 
* * * * * * *
1 2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
1 2 1 2 1 2
( , , ) ( , )
( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
IDS IDS No IDS No IDS
IDS No IDS No IDS No IDS IDS IDS IDS No IDS
F F
F F F F
ρ ρ ψ ρ ψ
ρ ρ ψ ρ ψ ρ ρ ψ ρ ρ ψ
− −
− − − −
− =
   − + −      
 
The first term on the right-hand side of the above equation represents the increase in the firm’s 
payoff if the firm alters its investigation strategy but users do not alter their hacking strategy after 
implementing the IDS. The second term represents the increase in the firm’s payoff when users 
alter their hacking strategy in response to the change in firm’s investigation strategy. Clearly, the 
first term incorporates the impact of the direct effect arising from targeted investigations, which, 
we denote as the detection effect of the IDS.  The second term incorporates the impact of the 
indirect (or strategic) effect arising from the change in hacking probability, which we denote as 
the deterrence effect of IDS. An analysis of these two effects on the value of IDS shows that the 
detection effect is positive for all parameter values, which implies that targeted investigations 
enabled by the IDS always helps the firm. However, the deterrence effect is positive, i.e., the IDS 
reduces the probability of hacking only when
I
DP
µ
β
≤
. When 
I
DP
µ
β
>
, the deployment of an IDS 
increases the probability of hacking, and the loss from the higher level of hacking offsets the 
benefit from improved detection, which, in turn, hurts the firm. 
Another important question is whether the implementation of an IDS has any impact on the 
firm’s decision to allow or deny external access. The following result answers this question.  
Corollary 2. When the firm implements only an IDS, it will allow external access iff 
I
D
I
F
P
P
Λ< . ■ 
We noted in Section 4 that when the firm implements neither a firewall nor an IDS, it will allow 
external access whenΛ< 1. Because I IF DP P< , in the region 1
I
D
I
F
P
P
<Λ< , the firm switches its 
policy from disallowing external access to one of allowing external access because of the IDS. 
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The reason for this result is that the improved detection enabled by IDS deters hackers, which, in 
turn, decreases the cost of allowing external access.  
5.3. The Value of Implementing both a Firewall and an IDS 
The expression for the value of firewall and IDS combination is complex. Therefore, we include 
it in the Appendix. However, an analysis of the expression reveals several insights into the 
interaction between an IDS and a firewall. The key research question that we address here is how 
the presence of one technology affects the value obtained from the other technology. We let Vx = 
Value of technology x when deployed alone, and Vx+y = Value of technologies x and y when 
deployed together. Then the interaction between technologies x and y can be categorized into 
three types as defined below. 
Complementary: Technologies x and y are complementary if Vx+y> Max(Vx, Vy) and Vx+y > 
Max(0,Vx )+Max(0,Vy). 
Substitutes: Technologies x and y are substitutes if Vx+y ≥ Max(Vx, Vy) and Vx+y ≤ 
Max(0,Vx)+Max(0,Vy). 
Conflicting: Technologies x and y are conflicting if Vx+y < Max(Vx, Vy). 
The definition of complementary technologies implies that deploying both technologies 
results in a higher value than deploying only one of them and, further, that the incremental value 
offered by a technology is greater when the firm deploys the other technology than when it does 
not. In case of substitutes, while deploying both technologies still results in a higher value than 
deploying only one of them, the incremental value obtained from a technology is less when the 
firm deploys the other technology as well. Finally, when the technologies are conflicting, 
deployment of both technologies hurts the firm, i.e., the firm realizes the greatest value by 
deploying only one of the technologies.  Now, we present one of the most significant results of 
this study, which describes the interaction between the values of firewall and IDS technologies 
with default configurations. 
Proposition 4.  
(1) When IDP
µ
β
≤  
• If  1, ,(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )(1( ) )
F I I F I F
F D D F D F
F F I I F F I F F
F D F F F D F F D
P P P P P P
Min Max
P P P P P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
−
< <
− + − − − −
                   Λ                    + +       
, 
then IDS and firewall substitute each other. 
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• If 
1 1
, ,
(1 ) 1 (1 )(1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )( ) )
I F I F F I
D F D F F D
I F F I F F F F I
F F D F F D F D F
P P P P P P
Min Max
P P P P P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
− −
< <
+ − − − − − + − −
                 Λ                     +    
 then IDS and firewall complement each other.   
• Otherwise, IDS and firewall conflict with each other.   
(2) When IDP
µ
β
> : IDS and firewall conflict with each other.     ■ 
Proposition 4 can be shown graphically as Figure 3. First, the very significant result in 
Proposition 4 is that deploying both a firewall and an IDS can be worse for a firm than deploying 
only one of them. The conflict effect always occurs when one of them has a negative value, 
which is not completely surprising because the technology that has the negative value diminishes 
the value of the other technology when both are deployed together. However, a surprising 
finding is that the IDS and the firewall may conflict with each other even when each has a 
positive value individually. This scenario occurs in the region where  IDP
µ
β
≤  and 
(1 ) (1 )
F F I
F F D
F F F F I
F D F D F
P P P
P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ− −
          <Λ<          + +    
. The explanation for the conflict between the 
firewall and the IDS in this region is as follows. If the firm does not deploy an IDS, then the firm 
finds that controlling the external access with the help of a firewall is valuable. However, when 
the firm deploys an IDS, the deterrence effect of the IDS reduces the hacking probability, which, 
in turn, makes allowing unfettered external access more desirable than controlled access using a 
firewall. In this scenario, deploying a firewall and controlling external access conflicts with the 
IDS.  In essence, an IDS, which is traditionally viewed as a detective control, serves as an access 
control because of its strategic effect on hackers. When the access control function of an IDS 
conflicts with that of a firewall, the firm will find it optimal to use only one of them.   
Second, firms that enjoy the complementary effect have a higher cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-
external-access than firms that enjoy the substitution effect. The question of interest to security 
managers is why complementarity requires a higher cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access. A 
firm that has a higher cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access is less likely to allow external 
access if a firewall is absent. Suppose the firm does not allow external access if a firewall is 
absent so that the IDS receives traffic only from internal users. If the firm implements a firewall 
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on top of the IDS, which necessarily means that the firm allows external access, the same IDS 
receives a higher traffic because now it also gets traffic from external users that have been 
allowed by the firewall.  Since the value of an IDS is directly proportional to the number of users 
it receives and since users do not change their strategies when a firewall is added to the security 
architecture, the value of IDS can only be higher in the presence of a firewall than in the absence, 
which indicates the complementary effect.  Now consider the case in which the firm 
Figure 3. Interaction between a firewall and an IDS 
{ 1 IDy P= , 1 (1 )
F I
F D
F F I
F D F
P P
x
P P Pζ ζ
=
−
     + 
, 3
1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
F I
F D
F F I
F D F
P P
x
P P Pζ ζ
−
=
− + − −
    
}
2
1
, ,
(1 ) 1 (1 )(1( ) )
I F I F
D F D F
I F F I F F
F F D F F D
P P P P
x Min Max
P P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ
−
=
+ − − − −
               +    
 
 
allows external access even without a firewall, which is likely to occur when the cost-to-benefit-
ratio-for-external-access is sufficiently low. In this scenario, if the IDS is augmented with a 
firewall, the traffic to the IDS decreases because the firewall will block some of the external 
users. Consequently, the incremental value of the IDS is lower in the presence of a firewall than 
in the absence.  In essence, in order for a firewall and an IDS to complement each other, each 
technology should perform its intended function: an IDS should act solely as a detective control 
and should not allow the firm to open up external access, and a firewall should act solely as an 
access control mechanism. 
CONFLICT 
(i)V(F)>0 
(ii)V(IDS)>0 
(iii)V(IDS+F)< 
V(IDS)+V(F) 
 
(i)V(F)>or<0 
(ii)V(IDS)>0 
(iii)V(IDS+F)> 
V(IDS)+max(0,V(F)) 
 
(i)V(F)<0 
(ii)V(IDS)>0 
(iii)V(IDS+F)<V(IDS) 
 
 
COMPLEMENT CONFLICT 
(i)V(F) <>0 
(ii)V(IDS)<0 
(iii)V(IDS+F)<V(F) 
 
/µ β
 
x1 x2 x3 
y1 
 
SUBSTITUTE CONFLICT 
(i)V(F)>or<0 
(ii)V(IDS)>0 
(iii)V(IDS+F) 
<V(IDS) 
 Λ
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Third, we find that in the no-external-access scenario, a firewall that is not beneficial when 
deployed alone may become beneficial when deployed along with an IDS. The intuition is the 
following. When only a firewall is deployed, it does not offer a positive value if the expected 
gain from external users is less than the expected loss from hacking. An IDS with a positive 
value reduces the probability of hacking. This enhances the expected benefit from external users 
and reduces the loss from hacking. Consequently, a firewall may become beneficial when used 
with an IDS even if it is not beneficial when used alone.  
6. Analysis of Optimal Configurations for Firewall and IDS in Stage 1 
In our analysis so far, we had assumed that the firewall and IDS are implemented using their 
default configurations. Now, we derive the firm’s optimal configurations for these technologies. 
Optimal configuration refers to the process of determining the best operating point ( *FDP and 
*F
FP for the firewall and 
*I
DP  and 
*I
FP for the IDS) that maximize the value to the firm by trading 
off two quality parameters within the technology profiles of security controls. For both IDS and 
firewall, we use their respective ROC curves to identify the optimal configuration point and then 
compute the value of each technology at the optimal configuration point. We assume that 
( ) FrF FD FP P= and ( ) I
rI I
D FP P= , where 0 , 1F Ir r< < .  
6.1 Optimally Configured Firewall 
We show the following result regarding the optimal configuration when the firm implements only 
a firewall. 
Proposition 5. 
(i) When the firm finds it optimal to allow external users in the no technology case, it is 
optimal to deploy a firewall configured at 
1
1
* (1 )
( )
FrF F
F
cdrP
d c d
ζ
φωζ ω ζ
− − =   − + 
. The 
firewall offers a non-negative value at the optimal configuration point.    
       
(ii) When the firm finds it optimal to disallow external users in the  no technology case, 
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• if 1( (1 ) )F Fr r ζ
Λ<
+ −
, it is optimal to deploy a firewall configured at 
1
1
* (1 )
( )
FrF F
F
cdrP
d c d
ζ
φωζ ω ζ
− − =   − + 
. The firewall offers a non-negative value at the 
optimal configuration point.    
• Otherwise, it is optimal not to deploy a firewall and continue to disallow external 
users.           ■ 
Proposition 5 shows that if the firm allows external access in the absence of a firewall, then it 
always benefits by deploying an optimally configured firewall to control the external traffic. 
However, if the firm does not allow external access in the absence of a firewall, then it benefits 
from allowing external access and controlling the external traffic using a firewall only when 
cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access is lower than a threshold (i.e., 1( (1 ) )F Fr r ζ+ −
). Since 
the threshold increases with firewall quality, deploying an optimally configured firewall benefits 
more firms if the quality is sufficiently high.  
6.2 Optimally Configured IDS 
We know that when IDP
µ
β
> , the value of IDS is negative, and when IDP
µ
β
< , the value of IDS is 
positive. Therefore, the firm will always configure the IDS such that the detection rate is higher 
than or equal to µ
β
,  i.e.,  IDP
µ
β
≤ . We summarize the results regarding the optimal configuration 
of the IDS below. 
Proposition 6. When the firm implements only an IDS, the optimal configuration is given by 
*I
DP
µ
β
= , and the firm realizes a non-negative value at the optimal configuration.  ■ 
It is interesting to note that the firm configures the IDS at the same point irrespective of how the 
firm handles the external access.  
6.3 Optimally Configured Firewall and IDS Combination 
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We know that when ( / ) IDPµ β > , IDS and firewall conflict with each other. So, the firm 
configures the IDS such that ( / ) IDPµ β ≤  when the IDS is deployed together with a firewall. The 
optimal configuration for the firewall and IDS combination is given in the following result. 
Proposition 7.  If 
1
1
(1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    Λ<     + −   
, the firm implements both firewall and IDS and 
configures them at 
*I
DP
µ
β
=  and 
1
*
1
(1 )
( )
F
F
I
I
r
r
F F
D r
r
cdrP
d c cd
ζ
µ
φ ωζ ζ
β
−
−
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Otherwise, the firm only implements the IDS and configures it at *IDP
µ
β
= and disallows external 
access.            ■ 
The most interesting insights from Propositions 5, 6, and 7 relate to (a) how the 
configurations of the firewall and the IDS change when they are deployed together, compared to 
when they are deployed alone and (b) how optimal configuration affects the interaction between 
the two. We find that (i) the configuration point of the IDS does not change whether it is used 
alone or together with a firewall, and (ii) the firewall is configured to operate at a lower detection 
rate when it is used with an IDS than without, i.e., *FDP (when used alone) > *FDP (when used with 
an IDS). For example, suppose  0.3, 0.5, 50,F Ir r ω= = = 0.1, 2, 100, 0.5,c dζ φ= = = =  
0.5, 8,ε µ= = and 10β = . We find that the optimal configuration points for the firewall when 
used together with an IDS and when used alone, respectively are *FDP = 0.494, *FFP = 0.095 and 
*F
DP = 0.548, *FFP = 0.134. Knowing that there is a detective control after the firewall, the firm 
chooses to be less strict in allowing access, because the IDS acts as a deterrent to users that gain 
access. Such deterrence is absent when there is no IDS, causing the firm to be stricter in allowing 
access. Surprisingly, the implementation of a firewall does not change the configuration of the 
IDS. The reason for this result is two-fold: (i) the firewall is not a control against internal 
hackers, and (ii) the firewall is not a deterrent against external hackers. Unlike IDS, external 
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hackers are not penalized when they are stopped by a firewall, therefore they do not change their 
attack strategies based on the existence of a firewall. In the same vein, the strategy of internal 
hackers is unaffected by the firewall because they do not have to pass through the firewall. Since 
users’ (both internal and external) hacking strategies are unaffected by the firewall configuration, 
and all users are identical from the IDS’s perspective, the configuration of an IDS is unaffected 
by the firewall. 
Another interesting observation from Propositions 5, 6, and 7 is that an optimally configured 
firewall is valuable in a larger region when it is deployed with an optimally configured IDS. So, 
a firm that prefers to block external access even with an optimally configured firewall may prefer 
to deploy the firewall instead of blocking external access when it deploys an optimally 
configured IDS also. The intuition is that the IDS makes the firewall more valuable due to the 
complementarity effect between them, as explained before. 
The following result shows that how the firewall and the IDS interact with each other when 
they are configured optimally. 
Corollary 3. Optimally configured firewall and IDS substitute each other when 
1
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.   ■ 
The above result shows that optimally configured IDS and firewall never conflict with each 
other. However, even with the optimal configuration, firewall and IDS do not necessarily 
complement each other. An analysis of the regions in which an optimally configured firewall and 
an optimally configured IDS complement or substitute each other shows that an optimally 
configured firewall and an optimally configured IDS can complement each other only if the firm 
does not allow external access in the no-technology case. If the firm allows external access in the 
no-technology case, optimally configured IDS and firewall only substitute each other. In 
summary, we find that by optimally configuring an IDS and a firewall, a firm eliminates the 
negative effect from joint implementation of these technologies. That is, optimally-configured 
IDS and firewall always offer a non-negative value and never conflict with each other. 
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7. Robustness of Our Results: Alternative Model Specifications 
In previous sections, we analyzed a model in which all users were homogenous with respect to 
their utility from hacking and penalty for hacking when caught. While users were classified into 
different types such as external versus internal and legal versus illegal, they differed only with 
respect to the benefit they offered to the firm. A case could be made that external hackers may 
incur a lower expected penalty than internal hackers because external hackers are more difficult 
to catch than internal hackers. Similarly, there could be differences in their utilities because the 
motivations of internal and external hackers are often different (Ciampa 2005). In this section, 
we analyze whether our results are robust to changes in our assumption about the homogeneity 
of users’ utility and penalty parameters.  
7.1 Alternative 1: Heterogeneity in Incentives to Hack between Legal and Illegal Users 
In our base model, we assumed that, under normal use, the firm realizes a positive payoff only 
when the user is legal. The base model did not consider the payoff to a user under normal use. In 
many situations, a legal user conducts normal business with a firm because she has some 
economic payoff, and an illegal user realizes a positive economic payoff only by hacking. On the 
other hand, if a legal user is caught hacking, she is likely to lose her current and future payoff 
from the normal business, in addition to any other penalty, but an illegal user that is caught 
hacking suffers only from the penalty. Consequently, a legal user is likely to have less (or no) 
incentive to hack compared to an illegal user. We model such heterogeneity in incentives to hack 
between legal and illegal users by analyzing a model in which legal users do not have incentives 
to hack whereas illegal users decide to hack depending on their utility from hacking and penalty 
if caught hacking. The rest of the model remains the same as that of the base model. 
We can show that all our results (Propositions 1 – 7 and Corollaries 1-3) hold qualitatively in 
the new model. The only differences between a result in our base model and the corresponding 
result in the new model relate to the expressions for the cut-off values that separate different 
regions. For example, the result corresponding to the interaction between a firewall and an IDS 
in the new model is given below. 
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 then IDS and firewall substitute each other. 
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 then IDS and firewall complement each other.   
• Otherwise, IDS and firewall conflict with each other.   
(2) When IDP
µ
β
> : IDS and firewall conflict with each other.  
A comparison of Proposition 4 and Proposition 4B shows that they are qualitatively identical. 
Similar observation applies for all other results also. Further, we confirmed that the intuition for 
a result in the base model and that of the corresponding result in the new model were also 
identical. Hence, we conclude that homogeneity in incentives of legal and illegal users does not 
drive our results.  
7.2 Alternative 2: Heterogeneity in Incentives to Hack between Internal and External Users 
We also analyzed the case in which internal and external users are heterogeneous with respect to 
the penalty if caught hacking. In this model, users are homogenous in all other dimensions. The 
primary difference between the two alternative models considered in this section is the 
following. In alternative 1, the hacking probability is different for legal and illegal users, but is 
independent of whether the user is internal or external. However, in alternative 2, the hacking 
probability is different for internal and external users, but is independent of whether the user is 
legal or illegal.  
In alternative 2, the net penalty was assumed to be β  and β∆  for an internal and an external 
hacker, respectively, where 0 1<∆< . Again, we found that while equilibrium strategies were 
different from those for the base model, our results regarding the value of firewall, value of IDS, 
value of firewall and IDS combination, and the nature of interaction between a firewall and an 
IDS in terms of complementary, substitution, and conflict effects were qualitatively identical to 
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those reported in our base model. However, the algebraic expressions were significantly more 
complex than those in the base model because hacking rates were different for external and 
internal users.9 Hence, we conclude that homogeneity in incentives of internal and external users 
does not drive our results.  
In summary, the analysis of alternative model specifications shows that all our results about 
the value of firewall and IDS technologies are robust and are not driven by the specific 
assumptions about the user behavior. Thus, we conclude that our explanations in terms of 
deterrence and detection effects of an IDS and access control function of a firewall and an IDS 
are the drivers for the results we obtained in this paper. 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
The analysis presented in previous sections offered important theoretical insights into the role 
played by configuration on the value of IDS and firewall technologies. From a manager’s 
perspective, important implications of our analysis pertain also to insights about the optimal 
firewall and IDS deployment policies. The optimal deployment policy offers guidance on when 
the firm should implement both a firewall and an IDS, when it should implement only an IDS, 
only a firewall, or neither, and whether the firm should allow external access when it does not 
use a firewall. These policies can be derived directly from the results stated in previous sections. 
We depict the optimal deployment policy graphically, as shown in Figure 4.  The figure assumes 
that the firm configures the firewall and the IDS at their optimal configuration points. The figure 
reveals that a firm should implement both a firewall and an IDS when the cost-to-benefit-ratio-
for-external-access is low. If this ratio is very low, even though the firm should implement both, 
the technologies substitute (imperfectly) each other. If the ratio is moderately low, then the 
technologies complement each other. When cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access is 
sufficiently high, the firm should restrict the access only to insiders and deal with hacking that 
come from insiders with the help of an IDS.  This result runs counter to the recommendation by 
some in the IT security community to rely only on firewalls for balancing the access and 
protection needs (Gartner 2003)10. We also find that optimal security architectures require 
implementation of both a firewall and IDS, except in a case in which the cost-to-benefit ratio of 
                                                 
9  For the sake of brevity, we do not reproduce the results here. The analysis of this extension is available from the 
authors.  
10
 This result assumes that the firm configures its controls optimally before implementing them.  If the firm is to 
deploy its security controls with default configurations, then the optimal security architecture may require the firm to 
implement only a firewall (see Cavusoglu, Raghunathan and Cavusoglu 2005).  
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external access is sufficiently high. An example for this could be military and defense systems in 
which the benefit from an external access is very small because the proportion of external users 
who are legal is very low (even though damage cost can be higher compared to other systems). 
Figure 4. Design of the optimal security architecture,  
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We used a stylized model for our analysis, and the model has several limitations. We 
assumed that the penalty is enforced as a result of hacking. This is very crucial for determining 
the value of an IDS. Unlike an IDS, a firewall does not require any penalty on hackers. Therefore 
the value of IDS can be lower in reality than what is presented here, if the enforcement of 
penalty is difficult. Since the value of IDS directly impacts the design of the optimal security 
architecture, our result about the optimal security architecture should be taken cautiously. The 
enforceability issue can be one of the reasons why firms consider firewalls as a mandatory 
technology and IDS as an optional technology in an IT security architecture. The use of default 
configurations may be another reason why security architectures always use a firewall.  
Our model does not capture the fact that hackers may shift their resources to target different 
firms depending on the security controls deployed by firms.  This issue was recently addressed 
by Cremonini and Nizovtsev (2006), who model the behavior of attackers when attackers are 
able to obtain complete information about the security characteristics of their targets and when 
such information is unavailable. They find that when attackers are able to distinguish targets by 
their security characteristics and switch between multiple alternative targets, the effect of a given 
security measure is stronger. That is due to the fact that attackers rationally put more effort into 
attacking systems with low security levels. Ignoring that effect would result in underinvestment 
in security or misallocation of security resources. Furthermore, we considered a one-shot game 
in our analysis. In reality, the game between a firm and hackers is a repeated one, with each party 
0 a b 
Cost-to-
benefit ratio 
of external 
access 
Deploy IDS and Firewall 
together (substitutes) 
Deploy IDS and Firewall 
together (complementary) 
 Disallow external access  
and deploy an IDS 
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trying to maximize its current and future periods’ payoffs by observing the past. We leave this 
analysis to future research. Other extensions such as the impact of firm’s risk profile on 
configuration decisions and an analysis of other functional forms for the ROC curve are also left 
for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2. Probability Computations 
Event Probability Expression 
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normal use by an external legal user given that IDS has 
not generated an alarm ( )
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PROOFS OF RESULTS 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The expected payoffs for the firm in the alarm and no-alarm states and the expected payoff for 
the user, respectively, are: 
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 + − − − − 
 + − − − − − − + −  =−
− − − + −
                     (A1) 
2 2
2
2
(1 )( (1 ))(1 (1 ) )
(1 )(1 )( (1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) )( , ) (1 (1 ) )( (1 ) 1)
I F F
D D F
I F F F
F F D F
NA F F I I
D F D F
P c d P P
P P c P P
F
P P P P
ψ ρ ρ φ ε ζ εζ
ψ ω ε εζ ρ ε ζ εζ
ρ ψ
ε ζ εζ ψ ψ
 − + − − − − 
 + − − − + − − − − −  =−
− − − + − −             (A2) 
                
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( (1 ))I ID DH P Pρ ρ ψ ψµ ψβ ρ ρ= − + −                                                        (A3) 
The first derivatives of payoffs with respect to the decision variables are: 
1 2( (1 ))I ID D
H P Pµ β ρ ρ
ψ
∂
= − + −
∂
                                                          (A4) 
1
(1 (1 ) )( ( (1 ) ))F F I I IA D F D F D
F P P d P c P Pε ζ εζ φ ψ ψ ψ
ρ
∂
= − − − − − +
∂
  (A5) 
2
(1 (1 ) )( (1 ) (1 (1 ) ))F F I I INA D F D F D
F P P d P c P Pε ζ εζ φ ψ ψ ψ
ρ
∂
= − − − − − − − −
∂
                                   (A6) 
We can verify that, for a given ψ ,
1
AF
ρ
∂
∂
 = 0 and 
2
NAF
ρ
∂
∂
=0 cannot be satisfied simultaneously. We 
can also verify that 1 2/ /A NAF Fρ ρ∂ ∂ ≥∂ ∂ . Consequently, in the equilibrium, 
1
AF
ρ
∂
∂
>0 and 
2
NAF
ρ
∂
∂
=0, or 
1
AF
ρ
∂
∂
=0 and 
2
NAF
ρ
∂
∂
<0. Therefore we have two possible equilibrium scenarios: (i) 
1 21,0 1ρ ρ= < <  and (ii) 1 20 1, 0ρ ρ< ≤ = .  
(i)  1 21,0 1ρ ρ= < <  
In this scenario, (A4) and (A6) must be equal to zero, and (A5)>0. Solving (A4) and (A6) for 2ρ  
andψ respectively, we get 
2
*
(1 )
I
D
I
D
P
P
µ β
ρ
β
−
=
−
                                    (A7) 
* (1 )
( ) (1 )
I
F
I I I
D F D
c P
c P P P d
ψ
φ
−
=
− + −
                                                      (A8) 
Since 20 1ρ< < ,  we get the condition 1IDP
µ
β
< < . Substituting (A8) into (A5) shows that (A5) 
is indeed positive. 
(ii) 1 20 1, 0ρ ρ< ≤ =  
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In this scenario, (A4) and (A5) must be equal to zero, and (A6)<0. Solving (A4) and (A5) for 1ρ  
andψ respectively, we get 
1
*
I
DP
µ
ρ
β
=                                       (A9) 
*
( )
I
F
I I I
D D F
cP
d P c P P
ψ
φ
=
− −
                                                                   (A10) 
Since 10 1ρ< ≤ ,  we get the condition 0 IDP
µ
β< ≤ . Substituting (A10) into (A6) shows that (A6) 
is indeed negative. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
It follows from the payoff expressions given in Table 3. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
It follows from the value of IDS expressions given in Table 4.  
The Value of Firewall and IDS Combination 
From the equilibrium payoffs for the firm in no technology and firewall plus IDS cases given in 
Table 3, we can calculate the value of firewall and IDS combination. However the expressions 
for the value of firewall and IDS combination are complex. Instead we compare the value of 
firewall and IDS combination with the value of firewall only and the value of IDS only in all 
parameter regions. This comparison gives us the following table. Please note that (Value of IDS) 
and (Value of F) represent value of individual controls, and can be different in different regions. 
Table A1. The Value of IDS and Firewall in Combination 
A= ( (1 ) ( )( ))( (1 ) ) ( ) (1 )( ) (1 )
I I I F F I F
F D F D F D F
I I I
D F D
cd P c d c P P P P d c P P
c P P d P
ε φ ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− − − − − + − − −
− + −
 
B= ( )( )( (1 ( (1 ) ))(1 ) (1 (1 (1 ))))( ( ) (1 ))
I I F F F
D F D F F
I I I
D F D
c P P d c d P P P
d c P P d P
φ ε ζ ζ φ ω ε ζ
φ φ
− − − − − + − + − − −
− + −
 
Region Condition(s) Value of IDS+F  Comparison 
(Value of IDS) + A (1 ) ( )
(1 )
I I I
D D F
I
F
P c P P
P
ωζ
ωζ
− + −
Λ<
−
 
(Value of F) + B 
(Value of IDS) + C (1 ) ( ) 1(1 )
I I I
D D F
I
F
P c P P
P
ωζ
ωζ
− + −
<Λ<
−
 (Value of F) + B 
(Value of IDS) + C 
I
DP
µ
β
>
 
1Λ>  
(Value of F) + B 
(Value of IDS) < or 
> (Value of IDS+F) 
 
(Value of F) >  
(Value of IDS+F) 
(Value of IDS) + D 1Λ<  
(Value of F) + E 
(Value of IDS) + D 1
I
D
I
F
P
P
  <Λ<   
 
(Value of F) + E 
(Value of IDS) + F 
I
DP
µ
β
≤
 
I
D
I
F
P
P
  Λ>   
 
(Value of F) + E 
(Value of IDS) < or 
> (Value of IDS+F) 
 
(Value of F) <  
(Value of IDS+F) 
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C= ( (1 ) ( )( ))(1 (1 ) ) ( ) (1 )(1 )( ) (1 )
I I I F F I F
F D F D F D F
I I I
D F D
cd P c d c P P P P d c P P
c P P d P
ε φ ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− − − − − − − − + − − −
− + −
 
D= ( (1 ) ) ( )( )
I F F I F
F D F D F
I I
D F
cd P P P d c P P
d c P cP
ε ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− + − −
− +
 
E= ( )( )( (1 ( (1 ) )) (1 (1 (1 ))))(( ) )
I I F F F
D F D F F
I I
D F
c d c P P d P P P
d d c P cP
φ ε ζ ζ ω ε ζ
φ φ
− − − − + + − − −
− +
 
F= (1 (1 ) ) ( ) (1 )( )
I F F I F
F D F D F
I I
D F
cd P P P d c P P
d c P cP
ε ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− − − − + − −
− +
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
From Table A1, we know that when ( / ) IDPµ β > , IDS and firewall are conflicting. Otherwise 
(when ( / ) IDPµ β ≤ ) we should investigate each region to determine the interaction effect.  
Region 1: ( 1Λ< ) 
In this region, firm (i) allows all external users in no technology architecture, and (ii) allows all 
external users in IDS only architecture. We know that Value of (IDS+F) can be less than Value 
of IDS (see the comparison column in table A1). If this is the case, controls are also conflicting. 
Otherwise controls can complement or substitute each other. We can write the condition for 
{Value of (IDS+F)> Value of IDS}from Table A1 as ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
Λ>
− +
.                                                                                                
Depending on the value of ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ− +
, there are two scenarios.  
Scenario 1 
(1 )F F ID F D
F I
F F
P P P
P P
ζ ζ− +
>  
Scenario 2 
(1 )F F ID F D
F I
F F
P P P
P P
ζ ζ− +
<  
We can show that in region 1, {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F}<0. We also 
know that Value of F > 0 if (1 )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
Λ>
− +
.                                                                                                              
In scenario 1,  Value of F>0 and Value of  (F+IDS)>Value of (IDS) when 
1(1 )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
, and  Value of  (F+IDS)< Value of (IDS) when 
(1 )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
Λ<
− +
. Hence, controls substitute each other when 
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1(1 )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
 since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of (F)}<0, and 
controls conflict with each other when (1 )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
Λ<
− +
. 
In scenario 2, Value of  (F+IDS)<Value of IDS when 1Λ< , and therefore, controls conflict with 
each other.  
Region  2: ( 1
I
D
I
F
P
P
  <Λ<   
) 
In this region, firm (i) does not allow any external user in no technology case, and (ii) allows all 
external users in IDS only case. From Table A1, the condition for {Value of (IDS+F)> Value of 
IDS} is ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
Λ>
− +
.                                                                                    
Assume that 1< ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ− +
(i.e., (1 )
F F I
D F D
F I
F F
P P P
P P
ζ ζ− +
<  ) 
When ( (1 ) )
F I I
F D D
F F I I
D F F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
, Value of (IDS+F)> Value of IDS. So we should evaluate 
{Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F}) to find the interaction effect. When 
1 ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
, Value of (IDS+F)< Value of IDS. So IDS and firewall conflict 
with each other. 
We also know that Value of F > 0 if (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
Λ<
− − −
. Depending on the value of  
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
, there are three scenarios  in region 2. 
Scenario 1: 
1< (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
< ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ− +
 
Scenario 2: 
( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ− +
<
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
<
I
D
I
F
P
P
 
Scenario 3: 
I
D
I
F
P
P
<
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
 
{Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F} in region 2 is negative when 
( )(1 ) ( )(1 (1 ) )I I I I I I F FD D F F D F D F
I I I
F F F
P c P P P c P P P P
P d P P
ζ ζ
φ ωζφ
− − − − − −
Λ< + +                 
Since this condition is always true in region 2, we can conclude that firewall and IDS can only 
substitute each other when all values are positive.  
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In scenario 1, Value of F <0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) when 
( (1 ) )
F I I
F D D
F F I I
D F F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
. Therefore controls complement each other when 
( (1 ) )
F I I
F D D
F F I I
D F F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
 since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – max(0,Value of 
F)}>0. Controls conflict with each other when ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
cd P P
d c P P P
ωζ ωζ
φ ζ ζ
< <
− − +
. 
In scenario 2, Value of F >0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) when 
(1 )
( (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) )
F I F
F D F
F F I F F
D F F D F
P P P
P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− + − − −
, and Value of F <0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> 
Value of (IDS) when (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P cd P
P P d c P
ωζ ωζ
ζ ζ φ
−
< <
− − − −
, and Value of F >0 and Value 
of  (F+IDS)< Value of (IDS) when ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
cd P P
d c P P P
ωζ ωζ
φ ζ ζ
< <
− − +
.Therefore, controls 
substitute each other when (1 )( (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) )
F I F
F D F
F F I F F
D F F D F
P P P
P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− + − − −
 since {Value of 
(IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F)}<0. Controls complement each other when 
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
 since (Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – max{0,Value of F}) 
>0. Finally controls conflict with each other when 1 ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
. 
In scenario 3, Value of F >0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) when 
( (1 ) )
F I I
F D D
F F I I
D F F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
, and  Value of F >0 and Value of  (F+IDS)< Value of (IDS) 
when 1 ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
. Therefore controls substitute each other when 
( (1 ) )
F I I
F D D
F F I I
D F F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
. Controls conflict with each other when 
1 ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
<Λ<
− +
. 
Assume that 1> ( (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ− +
(i.e., (1 )
F F I
D F D
F I
F F
P P P
P P
ζ ζ− +
>  ) 
Again depending on the value of (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
, there are two additional scenarios in 
region 2. 
Scenario 4: 
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(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
<
I
D
I
F
P
P
 
 
Scenario 5: 
I
D
I
F
P
P
<
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
 
 
In scenario 4, Value of F <0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) when 
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
, and Value of F >0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) 
when (1 )1 (1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
. Hence controls complement each other when 
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – max(0,Value of 
F)}>0. Controls substitute each other when (1 )1 (1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
 since {Value of 
(IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F)}<0. 
 
In scenario 5, Value of F >0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS). Therefore controls always 
substitute each other since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F)}<0. 
Region  3: (
I
D
I
F
P
P
  Λ>   
) 
In this region, the firm (i) does not allow any external user in no technology case, and (ii) does 
not allow any external user in IDS only case. From Table A1, the condition for {Value of 
(IDS+F)> Value of IDS} is (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
Λ<
− − −
.                                           
 
Since (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
>
I
D
I
F
P
P
,  we can say that when (1 )(1 (1 ) )
I F I
D F D
I F F I
F D F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
, 
Value of (IDS+F)> Value of IDS. So we should evaluate the expression {Value of (IDS+F) - 
Value of IDS – Value of F}}) to find the interaction effect. When (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
Λ>
− − −
, 
Value of (IDS+F)< Value of IDS. So IDS and firewall conflict with each other. We also know 
that Value of F > 0 if (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
Λ<
− − −
  . Depending on the value of  
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
, there are two scenarios in region 3. 
Scenario 1: 
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(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
<
I
D
I
F
P
P
 
Scenario 2: 
 
I
D
I
F
P
P
<
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
<
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
−
− − −
I
D
I
F
P
P
 
We can show that {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Value of F} in region 3 is positive. 
Therefore firewall and IDS can only complement each other when all costs are positive. 
In scenario 1, Value of F <0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) when  
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
I F I
D F D
I F F I
F D F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
, and Value of F <0 and Value of  (F+IDS)< Value of (IDS) 
when (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ
− − −
. Therefore, controls complement each other when 
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
I F I
D F D
I F F I
F D F F
P P P
P P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – Max{0,Value of 
F}}>0. Controls conflict with each other when (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ
− − −
. 
In scenario 2, Value of F >0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) when 
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
I F
D F
I F F
F D F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
, and Value of F <0 and Value of  (F+IDS)> Value of (IDS) 
when (1 ) (1 )(1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) )
F F I
F F D
F F F F I
D F D F F
P P P
P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ
− −
<Λ<
− − − − − −
,and Value of F <0 and Value of  
(F+IDS)< Value of (IDS) when (1 )(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ
− − −
. Therefore, controls complement 
each other when  (1 )(1 (1 ) )
I F
D F
I F F
F D F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ<
− − −
 since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – 
Value of F)}>0. Controls again complement each other when 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) )
F F I
F F D
F F F F I
D F D F F
P P P
P P P P Pζ ζ ζ ζ
− −
<Λ<
− − − − − −
 since {Value of (IDS+F) - Value of IDS – 
Max{0,Value of F}}>0. Finally controls conflict with each other when 
(1 )
(1 (1 ) )
F I
F D
F F I
D F F
P P
P P Pζ ζ
−
<Λ
− − −
. 
 
Although there are five possibilities depending on the value of firewall and IDS quality 
parameters, in all of these five possibilities, the transitions of interaction effects is the same. That 
is, the order of interaction effect from left to right is  
CONFLICT->SUBSTITUTE->COMPLEMENT->CONFLICT 
After carefully looking at threshold values that separate interaction effects in five possibilities, 
we can write the interaction results as in proposition 4 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
(i) All-external-access scenario 
Substituting ( ) FrFFP  for FDP  in the value of firewall expression, we get  
( ) (1 ) ( ( ) )FrF FF Fcd P P c d d
d
ε ζ εζ ω ωφ
φ
− + + −
. Taking a partial derivative of this expression with 
respect to FFP  and equating it to zero gives 
1
1
* (1 )
( )
FrF F
F
cdrP
d c d
ζ
φωζ ω ζ
− − =   − + 
 . Therefore 
1
* (1 )
( )
F
F
r
r
F F
D
cdrP
d c d
ζ
φωζ ω ζ
− − =   − + 
. Since both *FFP  and *FDP  must be between zero and one, we have 
the following conditions. 
1
ζ
Λ<   and  1(1 )F Fr r ζ
Λ<
+ −
 
Both of these conditions are satisfied all the time in the all-external-access scenario. In addition, 
since ( )22 (.) / FFP∂ ∂ <0, the above solutions constitute the optimal configuration point. The value 
at the optimal configuration point is always non-negative since the value expression is an 
increasing concave function. 
(ii) No-external-access scenario 
Substituting ( ) FrFFP  for FDP  in the value of firewall expression, we get  
( )( )(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) FrF F FF F Fc cP P Pdε ωζ ζ ζφ φ
         − − − − − −              
. Taking a partial derivative of this 
expression with respect to FFP  and equating it to zero gives 
1
1
* (1 )
( )
FrF F
F
cdrP
d c d
ζ
φωζ ω ζ
− − =   − + 
 . 
Therefore 
1
* (1 )
( )
F
F
r
r
F F
D
cdrP
d c d
ζ
φωζ ω ζ
− − =   − + 
. Since both *FFP  and *FDP  must be between zero and 
one, we have the following conditions. 
1
ζ
Λ<   and  1(1 )F Fr r ζ
Λ<
+ −
. 
Both of these conditions may not be satisfied in the no-external-access scenario. The stringent 
condition is 
1
(1 )F Fr r ζ
Λ<
+ −
                                                                                                                  
In addition, since ( )22 (.) / FFP∂ ∂ <0, the above solutions constitute the optimal configuration 
point only when 1(1 )F Fr r ζ
Λ<
+ −
. The value at the optimal configuration point is always non-
negative since the value expression is an increasing concave function. 
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When 1(1 )F Fr r ζ
Λ>
+ −
, the point that maximizes the value of firewall is *FFP >1. Since value 
expression is an increasing concave function, the value is maximized at *FFP =1, implying that all 
external users must be dropped.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
We know that when IDP
µ
β
> , the value of IDS is negative, and when IDP
µ
β
≤ , the value of IDS is 
positive. Therefore firm will always configure its IDS such that the detection rate is higher than 
or equal to µ
β
.  Given  IDP
µ
β
≤ , the firm can be in one of the three regions  
   (i) 1Λ<   (ii) 1
I
D
I
F
P
P
  <Λ<   
  (iii) 
I
D
I
F
P
P
  Λ>   
 
Since the condition for the firm to be in the first region is independent of IFP  and IDP , the firm 
that is already in region 1 cannot move to another region through configuration. However if the 
firm is in this region it can play with IDS detection and error rates to find the best point at which 
the value is maximized. Assuming that ( ) IrI ID FP P= , we can rewrite the value expression in term 
of IDP , and take a partial derivative of the expression w.r.t. IDP , we get: 
( )
( )( )( )
1/
21/
(1 )( (1 (1 )))( )I
I
rI
D I
rI I I
I D D D
c P r d d c
r c P P d P
ω ε ζ φ
φ
− + − − −
−
− +
 < 0.  So the firm configures its IDS at the lowest 
value of IDP . Since IDP
µ
β
≤ , the optimal configuration  point is ( )
1/
* *
, ,
Ir
I I
D FP P
µ µ
β β
  =   
. 
If 1Λ> , then through configuration the firm can move between (ii) and (iii).The derivative of 
the value of IDS in (ii) wrt IDP , is 
( )
( )( )( )
1/
21/
(1 )( (1 (1 )))( )I
I
rI
D I
rI I I
I D D D
c P r d d c
r c P P d P
ω ε ζ φ
φ
− + − − −
−
− +
 < 0 
The derivative of the value of IDS in (iii) w.r.t. IDP , is 
( )
( )( )( )
1/
21/
(1 )( )(1 )( )I
I
rI
D I
rI I I
I D D D
c P r d d c
r c P P d P
ω ε φ
φ
− + − −
−
− +
 < 0 
We know that at the boundary between regions (ii) and (iii) (i.e., 
I
D
I
F
P
P
  Λ=   
), Value of IDS in (ii) = 
Value of IDS in (iii). Since the value is decreasing function of IDP in both regions, and the value 
expression is a continuous function in regions (ii) and (iii), the firm chooses the minimum value of 
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I
DP  at optimal configuration. Given that IDP
µ
β
≤ , the optimal configuration  point is 
( )
1/
* *
, ,
Ir
I I
D FP P
µ µ
β β
  =   
. To sum up, irrespective of the region where the firm lies in, the optimal 
configuration point for IDS in IDS only case is( )
1/
* *
, ,
Ir
I I
D FP P
µ µ
β β
  =   
. 
Proof of Proposition 7 
We know that, for a given cost-to-benefit-ratio-for-external-access, (1) the value of firewall is 
the same for any value of IDP   and (2) the value of firewall plus IDS is always greater than the 
value of firewall when IDP
µ
β > . Therefore the firm should configure its IDS such that  
I
DP
µ
β ≤  
when IDS is deployed together with firewall.  
 
(i)  When 1Λ<  (i.e., when the firm finds it optimal to allow all external users in no technology 
case) 
Value of (IDS+F) =  
Value of IDS+ ( (1 ) ) ( )( )
I F F I F
F D F D F
I I
D F
cd P P P d c P P
d c P cP
ε ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− + − −
− +
 
 or  
Value of F+ ( )( )( (1 ( (1 ) )) (1 (1 (1 ))))(( ) )
I I F F F
D F D F F
I I
D F
c d c P P d P P P
d d c P cP
φ ε ζ ζ ω ε ζ
φ φ
− − − − + + − − −
− +
 
Substituting the value of either firewall or IDS when it is used alone in that region gives  
Value of (IDS+F) = 
( (1 (1 ))) ( (1 (1 ) ) (1 ( (1 ) )))
( )
I F F F
FF F D F
FI I
D F
c d cP P d P P P
d d c P cP
ω ε ζ ω ε εζ ε ζ ζ
ωεζ
φ φ
+ − − − + − + − − +
− −
− +
 
Writing the above value in terms of FDP  and IDP  by substituting  ( )
1
F
F r
DP  for 
F
FP and ( )
1
I
I r
DP  for 
I
FP , we get the value of (IDS+F) ~ f ( FDP , IDP ). To find the values of FDP and IDP  that maximize 
Value of (IDS+F), we take partial derivatives as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
21
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
Value of(IDS+F)
( )
I F F
I
I F F F Fr r r
D I D D D D
I
D I I r
I D D
c P r d P d P P P
P
r d c P c P
ε ω ε εζ ωεζ
φ
  − − + − + − + −  ∂  
=
∂   − +   
Value of(IDS+F)
I
DP
∂
∂
< 0  for any value of FDP . Therefore the firm tries to minimize IDP .  Since IDP  
cannot be less than µβ , the firm configures the IDS at 
1
* *( , ) ( , )
i
rI I
D FP P
µ µ
β β
 =   
. 
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The partial derivative w.r.t. FDP gives 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
1
(1 ) ( )
Valueof(IDS+F)
( )
I F I
I
F I F I Ir r r
D D F D D D
F
D F I I r
D F D D
cdP P r P d c P cd P
P
P r d c P c P
ε ζ εζ φ ω
φ
  − − − −  ∂  
=
 ∂  − +   
. 
Substituting the optimal value of IDP  to the above expression, we get 
 
( )
1 1
1
1
(1 ) ( )
( )
I I
F
I
r r
F F r
D F D
r
F
D F
cdP r P d c cd
P r d c c
µ µ µ
ε ζ εζ φ ω
β β β
µ µ
φ
β β
        − − − −             
       − +         
. 
Since 
1
( ) IrIDd c P cd
µ
φ ω
β
       − −         
 is always positive in this region, there is always a FDP  that will 
make the partial derivative zero. So we can conclude that 
1
1 1
* *
1 1
(1 ) (1 )( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
F
F F
I I
I I
r
r r
F F F F
D F r r
r r
cdr cdrP P
d c cd d c cd
ζ ζ
µ µ
φ ωζ ζ φ ωζ ζ
β β
− −
− −
             − −   =                − − − −                   
.               
These probabilities must be between zero and one. The condition for that is 
1
1
(1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    Λ<     + −   
 
Since this is always true in this region, there is no additional constraint for this equilibrium. 
 
(ii)  When 1Λ>  (i.e., when the firm finds it optimal to disallow all external users in no 
technology case) 
Value of (IDS+F)  
=Value of IDS+ ( (1 ) ) ( )( )
I F F I F
F D F D F
I I
D F
cd P P P d c P P
d c P cP
ε ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− + − −
− +
                  when 1
I
D
I
F
P
P
  <Λ<   
, 
=Value of IDS+ (1 (1 ) ) ( ) (1 )( )
I F F I F
F D F D F
I I
D F
cd P P P d c P P
d c P cP
ε ζ ζ φ ωεζ
φ
− − − − + − −
− +
  when   
I
D
I
F
P
P
  Λ>   
 
and  
=Value of F + ( )( )( (1 ( (1 ) )) (1 (1 (1 ))))(( ) )
I I F F F
D F D F F
I I
D F
c d c P P d P P P
d d c P cP
φ ε ζ ζ ω ε ζ
φ φ
− − − − + + − − −
− +
 
 44 
Substituting the value of either firewall or IDS when it is used alone in that region gives  
 
Value of (IDS+F) = 
(1 )( ) ( (1 (1 ) ) (1 ( (1 ) )))(1 ) ( )
I F F F
F F F D F
F I I
D F
c d cP P d P PP
d d c P cP
ε ω ω ε εζ ε ζ ζ
ωεζ
φ φ
− + − + − + − − +
− + −
− +
. 
Writing the above in terms of FDP  and IDP  by substituting  ( )
1
F
F r
DP  for 
F
FP and ( )
1
I
I r
DP  for 
I
FP , we 
get (IDS+F) ~ f ( FDP , IDP ). To find the values of FDP and IDP  that maximize Value of (IDS+F), we 
take partial derivatives as,  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
21
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
Valueof(IDS+F)
( )
I F F
I
I F F F Fr r r
D I D D D D
I
D I I r
I D D
c P r d P d P P P
P
r d c P c P
ε ω ε εζ ωεζ
φ
  − − + − + − + −  ∂  
=
∂   − +   
 
which is the same expression as in (i). Therefore, firm configures the IDS at 
1
* *( , ) ( , )IrI ID FP P
µ µ
β β
 =   
. 
The partial derivative w.r.t. FDP gives 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
1
(1 ) ( )
Valueof(IDS+F)
( )
I F I
I
F I F I Ir r r
D D F D D D
F
D F I I r
D F D D
cdP P r P d c P cd P
P
P r d c P c P
ε ζ εζ φ ω
φ
  − − − −  ∂  
=
 ∂  − +   
, 
which is the same expression as in (i).  
Substituting the optimal value of IDP  to the above expression, we get 
 
( )
1 1
1
1
(1 ) ( )
( )
I I
F
I
r r
F F r
D F D
r
F
D F
cdP r P d c cd
P r d c c
µ µ µ
ε ζ εζ φ ω
β β β
µ µ
φ
β β
        − − − −             
       − +         
. 
1
( ) IrIDd c P cd
µ
φ ω
β
       − −         
is positive when 
1
1 IrI
DP
µ
ζ β
−
 Λ<   
. We know that in (ii) , 1Λ> . 
Therefore 
1
IrI
DP
µ
ζ
β
−
 <   
 must be true. We also know that IDP =
µ
β
, so we get a condition 
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1I
I
r
rµ
ζ
β
−
 <   
, which is always true. Hence 
1
( ) IrIDd c P cd
µ
φ ω
β
       − −         
 is  positive when 
1
11
I
I
r
rµ
ζ β
−
 <Λ<   
 and negative when  
1
1
I
I
r
rµ
ζ β
−
 Λ>   
. When
1
1
I
I
r
rµ
ζ β
−
 Λ>   
, the partial derivative is 
always positive, implying that * *( , )F FD FP P =(1, 1) since the value is an increasing concave 
function. So firewall configuration is not an issue in that case. The firm should not use a firewall 
and disallow external access. So we can conclude that 
1
1 1
* *
1 1
(1 ) (1 )( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
F
F F
I I
I I
r
r r
F F F F
D F r r
r r
cdr cdrP P
d c cd d c cd
ζ ζ
µ µ
φ ωζ ζ φ ωζ ζ
β β
− −
− −
             − −   =                − − − −                   
 
when 
1
11
I
I
r
rµ
ζ β
−
 <Λ<   
. The condition that for these probabilities to be between zero and one is 
1
1
(1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    Λ<     + −   
 
This condition may not be satisfied when 
1
11
I
I
r
rµ
ζ β
−
 <Λ<   
because 1(1 )F Fr r ζ
     + − 
is less than 
1
ζ
. So we should restrict the region to 
1
11 (1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    <Λ<     + −   
. When 
1 1
1 1
(1 )
I I
I I
r r
r r
F Fr r
µ µ
ζ β ζ β
− −
         <Λ<         + −     
,  the partial derivative is always positive, implying that 
* *( , )F FD FP P =(1, 1) since the value function is increasing. So firewall configuration is not an issue. 
The firm should not use a firewall and disallow external access. 
 
Proof of Corollary 3 
We also know from proposition 7 that both IDS and firewall are deployed at their optimal 
configuration points when  
1
1
(1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    Λ<     + −   
. Therefore we focus on this region to 
analyze the interaction effect (i.e., configurable region).  
From proposition 4, we know that 
• if 1rΛ< , controls conflict with each other  
• if 1 min( ,max( 1, 2))
I
D
I
F
P
r r r
P
<Λ< , controls substitute each other 
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• if min( , max( 1, 2)) 3
I
D
I
F
P
r r r
P
<Λ< , controls complement each other 
• if 3rΛ> , controls conflict with each other 
If we substitute the optimal configuration points into the expression for r1, we get 
11(at optimal configuration)
( ) (1 )
I
I
F
r
r
F
cdr
r
d c cd r µφ ωζ ζ
β
−=
 − − −   
.  
In the configurable region, 1(at optimal configuration)r  is always less thanΛ . Therefore first 
alternative is not possible.  Similarly, 
1
*
* *
13(at optimal configuration)
1 (1 )
I
I
r
F r
F
F F
D F
P
r
P P
µ
ζ ζ β
−
  −   =     − − −   
 
We want to show that 
1
*
* *
1
1 (1 )
I
I
r
F r
F
F F
D F
P
P P
µ
ζ ζ β
−
  −   Λ<     − − −   
is true in the configurable region.  
When 0Λ=  (i.e., at the lower limit), the inequality holds. When 
1
1
(1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    Λ=     + −   
 
(i.e., at the upper limit), the inequality also holds. 
*
1
*
* *1
1lim
1 (1 )
I
I
F
D
r
F r
F
F FP
D F
P
P P
µ
ζ ζ β
−
−>
  −    =    − − −   
1
1
(1 )
I
I
r
r
F Fr r
µ
ζ β
−
    Λ=     + −   
. As Λ  increases,  
*
* *
1
1 (1 )
F
F
F F
D F
P
P Pζ ζ
 −     − − − 
 also increases, before reaching the upper limit,  Λ  is always less than 
1
*
* *
1
1 (1 )
I
I
r
F r
F
F F
D F
P
P P
µ
ζ ζ β
−
  −        − − −   
. Therefore the last alternative is not possible either.   
So, optimally configured firewall and IDS can only complement or substitute each other.  
 
Since 1(at optimal configuration) 1r <  and 2(at optimal configuration) 1r > , at optimal 
configuration, max( 1, 2) 2r r r= . Therefore, min( , max( 1, 2))
I
D
I
F
P
r r
P
is either 2r  or 
1I
I
r
I r
D
I
F
P
P
µ
β
−
 =   
. 
We  know that 
I
D
I
F
P
P
 is greater than one and does not change with Λ . We also know that 
2(at optimal configuration)r  is greater than one and increases with Λ . The maximum value of 
2(at optimal configuration)r  is 1(1 )F Fr r ζ
     + − 
, which is less than the maximum value of Λ  in 
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the configurable region. Therefore both complementary and substitution effects are possible. 
Since we cannot compare 
1I
I
r
rµ
β
−
    
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o Optimally configured controls complement each other when 
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